Introduction
Intellectual Property assets represent a growing share of firms' revenues. In 2014, Samsung paid Microsoft more than one billion dollars of licensing royalties to use the Android technologies in its mobile phones (Wall Street Journal, 2014) . This is much more than the sum of revenues earned by Microsoft in 2013 from the Xbox product line, Skype, Kinect and the Windows Phone line, totalling to 800 million dollars (Microsoft, 2013) . Firms' revenues derived from Intellectual Property are broader than royalty incomes, and can encompass capital gains, damages for infringement, the sale income of products incorporating IP, and notional royalties. Like profit earned from tangible assets, firm's revenues from IP are also subject to taxation.
Firms can use the intangible nature of their patents to shift income and avoid taxation (Griffith et al., 2014) . The discretionary aspect of the patent location decision allows firms to have their revenues earned from high-tax regimes countries taxed in attractive low-tax rates locations. Patent offices do not require patents to be legally owned in the same location as where the corresponding technology is protected. Moreover, patent revenues are subject to taxes in the country where they are legally owned, which is not necessarily the same as the country where the technology is protected.
Using the discreteness of patent location, firms may also differentiate between the location of R&D efforts, and the location of the resulting patent. As corporate income tax rates and the existence of advantageous tax systems for Intellectual Property revenues differ widely across countries, this profit maximizing strategy can lead to substantial tax savings.
In the recent years, many European countries have introduced advantageous tax regimes for income derived from Intellectual Property. These regimes, referred to as patent boxes in the rest of the paper, grant corporate revenues derived from patents a preferential tax rate. Their stated objective is to stimulate R&D in the country of implementation. However, patent boxes have heterogeneous features, and as a consequence, they generate fiscal competition between European countries. It is feared that they might induce distortion between the location of patent legal ownership and firm's real R&D activities (Hines Jr (1999) ; Barrios et al. (2012) ) and deteriorate governments' revenues (Huizinga and Laeven, 2008) . The UK patent box, launched in 2013, allowed more than £340 million tax breaks during the first year of the program, beneficiaries being mostly large firms. 1 This paper aims to contribute to the growing debate on the relationship between the distortion of the location of the revenue generated by patent protection and patent boxes, by investigating their relationship with firms' behaviours of international patent relocation. Patent Box regimes have been the subject of intense criticisms by intergovernmental organizations. The OECD identifies them as 1 http://www.worldipreview.com/news/uk-patent-box-claims-hit-343m-in-first-year-12290 harmful when they encourage companies to "shift profits from the location in which the value was actually created to another location where they may be taxed at a lower rate". None of the patent box regimes evaluated by the the OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (BEPS) project was found successful in ensuring that only patents derived from substantial activities effectively carried out by the taxpayer are subject to preferential tax treatment. The European Council is now inviting European governments to adapt their patent box regimes in order to guarantee that the application of an IP preferential tax regime is dependent on the level of R&D carried out by the taxpayer itself.
In the case of internationally relocated patents, the R&D effort undertaken to develop the patent is unlikely to have been realized by the taxpayer. This paper tackles two questions. Firms can opportunistically use the fiscal competition generated by permissive rules on patent box regimes, the lack of coordination between European countries and the intangible nature of IP assets to shift income. First, this paper investigates the incentives provided by patent box countries in firms' decisions to internationally relocate patents. By doing so, it aims to provide empirical evidence on the opportunistic practice denounced by the OECD/G20 BEPS project.
Second, this paper studies the heterogeneity of firms' patent relocation activities with respect to the diversity of the features of patent box policies. Patent boxes vary widely on the stringency and scope of the requirements they impose on the taxpayer. Policy makers could exploit the variability of the designs of such regimes to deter harmful tax practices.
As far as I can tell, no existing study has investigated patent boxes with regards to patents' changes of ownership. Existing work on patent boxes is scarce and recent. Griffith et al. (2014) and Alstadsaeter et al. (2015) find patent boxes to have a strong effect on attracting patents' initial location. Schwab and Todtenhaupt (2016) find positive cross-border externalities of domestic patent boxes on foreign countries' domestic R&D investments, suggesting a response to profit shifting opportunities.
Investigating the effect of R&D tax incentives on the trading of patents, Bösenberg and Egger (2014) find a positive effect of a patent box in the destination country. However, they use a crude measure of the patent box and do not consider the features of the regime. Moreover, the positive effect is non-robust to their different specifications.
I derive a simple theoretical model examining a company's decision to transfer a patent ownership to a new owner in a new country, based on the economic intuition that the transfer will be realized only if the expected revenues from the patent's new ownership are higher than the expected revenues from the initial ownership. I derive assumptions from this theoretical framework, with the objective to understand the incentives provided by fiscal characteristics in firms' decisions to internationally transfer patents. To test these hypotheses, I create a comprehensive dataset of international relocations of European granted patent applications for the period 1997-2015. This new dataset covers all the registered patent relocations to European countries, and spans over a time period during which more than a dozen patent box regimes have been introduced. It provides an ideal set-up for the purpose of analysing patent boxes and their heterogeneity.
Using this original dataset, I provide first descriptive evidences of international patent relocation in Europe. European countries are highly heterogeneous, both in the volume of patent relocations they attract, and in their balance -defined as the index between attracted and lost patents. They can be sorted in three categories. First, countries attracting high volumes of patents with a neutral balance -like Germany, are likely to take active parts in real technology transfers transactions, where the transfers of patent rights are combined with knowledge transfers, therefore likely to be associated with follow-on R&D efforts. Second, countries with a very positive balance but attracting low volumes of patent relocations -like Malta, are likely to be preferred for fiscal reasons. Third, countries attracting high volumes of patent relocations and presenting very positive balance -like Ireland, are likely to be choice destinations for patent relocations, where firms can combine fiscal optimization and knowledge transfer to a qualified workforce in strategic geographical locations.
I run a series of count data regressions on firms' yearly flows of international transfers of patent ownership. I investigate patent transfers with regard to patent box regimes, and study how firms' incentives to relocate patents vary with the heterogeneity of the designs of patent box regimes. Results are the following.
Countries with a patent box regime in force attract higher patent relocation flows. This result is significant at the 0.1% level and holds in a wide range of specifications. The more important is the rebate allowed through a patent box regime, the higher are patent relocation flows. Thus, firms' incentives to internationally relocate patent ownership are all the more stronger as the tax rebate on IP revenue is important.
The fiscal characteristics of the country of destination matter more than the fiscal characteristics of the country of origin in firms' decision to transfer patent ownership. It suggests that patent relocations are made with the objective to benefit from an advantageous tax regime , rather than to escape an unprofitable tax policy.
The fiscal incentives provided by patent box regimes are stronger when the country has an high R&D activity. A firm response to a 1% higher tax rebate would be expected to be 2.25 times higher if the rebate occurred in an R&D intensive country, all else equal in the model. This indicates that firms consider several dimensions in their decisions to relocate patent ownership. Countries combining high R&D levels and advantageous taxation are destination of choice for patent relocation. They allow firms to associate fiscal optimization with developed communication networks, strategic geographic locations and knowledge transfer to qualified workforces.
Firms are more sensitive to fiscal characteristics when relocating high quality patents. Indeed, high quality patents are expected to generate higher revenues. Similarly, the additional fiscal incentive provided by countries with an intense R&D activity is stronger for high quality patents.
Patent boxes with different features provide different incentives on firms' decisions to relocate patent ownership. When a development condition is imposed on the acquirer so that she is required to perform substantial additional R&D effort to benefit from the tax allowance, the tax rebate is no longer associated with more incoming patent flows. Although no causality should be inferred in the absence of data on variation of the features of a given patent box country, the results suggest that policy makers could play on the designs of the patent box regimes to affect the incentives for firms to relocate patents, and to limit transfers driven by fiscal optimization motives.
I differentiate between two types of patent international relocation, namely transfers between firms of the same parent group, and transfers between unrelated economic entities. Like intra-group transfers of patents, international relocation following patent trade is sensitive to fiscal characteristics.
Fiscal incentives are stronger in R&D-intensive countries for intra-company relocations, but not for inter-companies transfers. It may first indicate that these transfers of ownership are realized with different purposes, so that there are positive externalities associated with the co-location of patents and R&D efforts only for intra-company transfers. It may also indicate that the stricter rules imposed on intra-company transfers can deter pure fiscal optimization by providing firms with the incentives to perform additional R&D efforts. Indeed, such binding constraints are associated with fewer patent transfers.
I discuss the potential endogeneity of R&D expenditures. I propose a novel instrument to tackle this identification issue, using a control function approach. This paper is organised as follows. Section 2 reviews the existing literature this work relates to. Section 3 introduces a simple theoretical framework. Section 4 describes the creation and the characteristics of the dataset I use. Section 5 presents the econometric specifications. Section 6 documents the results of the estimations. Section 7 concludes.
Background
This paper first relates to the literature on markets for technologies. An ample stream of this literature has been focusing on the licensing of patents (Anand and Khanna (2000) ; Arora et al. (2004) ; Gambardella et al. (2007) ; Giuri et al. (2007) ). As to the empirical studies on the contemporary transfers of patent ownership, they are quite scarce, and recent. An important proportion of the existing work on patent changes of ownership uses U.S. data, and therefore, focuses on the U.S. market. This new stream of literature started with the work of Serrano (2010) , who performed the first large-scale analysis on U.S. data. He found that the probability of a U.S patent being traded depends on its characteristics: younger, more frequently cited and recently traded patents are more likely to be transferred. Transferred U.S. patents are highly skewed in terms of value (Serrano, 2011) . The effect of patent transactions on the enforcement is heterogeneous, and depends on the nature of the comparative advantages that generated the transfer (Galasso et al., 2013) . Hochberg et al. (2014) investigate the relationship between patent transfers and venture lending, finding venture lending to be stimulated by more intense activity on the secondary market for patents.
Few studies use non-U.S. patent data. Ménière et al. (2012) focuses on the market for patents valid in France. de Rassenfosse et al. (2013) use Australian data to study to which extent patent assist trade in technology. Gäßler (2016) This paper also connect to the literature on corporate taxation, patent boxes, and patent location.
Several studies have investigated the impact of taxation on firm's behavior. The national level of corporate income tax is a significant determinant of the initial choice of patent location (Griffith et al. (2014) ; Bösenberg and Egger (2014) ). It has been found to negatively affect firms' decisions to locate patents in a given country (Dischinger and Riedel (2011), 2011; Karkinsky and Riedel (2012) ). Firms' patenting is positively correlated with R&D incentives, whereas negatively affect by corporate tax (Ernst and Spengel, 2011) . Higher effective marginal and average tax rate on R&D have been found to raise patent exports, and to reduce patents imports (Bösenberg and Egger, 2014) . Patent boxes are likely to attract the location of new patents (Griffith et al., 2014) , this being particularly true for high quality patents (Alstadsaeter et al., 2015) . However, (Bösenberg and Egger, 2014 ) find a negative effect of patent boxes regimes in patent filings. They also find significant effects of patent boxes on the volume of traded patents between countries, but the results are not robust to different specifications.
Simple framework
Let A be the country where the patent x of firm i is initially owned. The expected profit of firm i from patent x during year t in country A is E(π x,i,A,t ), defined as
where t A,t is the level of effective taxation on corporate revenue derived from IP assets in country A at year t, E(R x,i,t ) is the expected revenue from patent x for firm i at t and C A,t are the non fiscal costs derived from location A at time t. C A,t can be either negative or positive.
The expected profit of firm j if it acquires patent x and relocates it in B is E(π x,j,B,t ), defined as
C B , t can be positive, for example in the case of further R&D efforts that need to be incurred to benefit from a patent box regime with a development condition. It can also be negative, for instance when the new location allows to benefit from knowledge spillovers, or from the proximity with judicial entities. I make the assumption that the expected revenue from patent x -E(R x,j,t ) -is independent from the location of patent legal ownership, but depends on the owner's ability to exploit its patent portfolio.
Indeed, patent revenues are derived from patent protection, which is independent from the location of patent legal ownership.
With the assumption that the cost of transferring a patent is small enough so that firms can maximise profit at each t, patent x will be transferred from i located in A to j located in B if with the transfer, a greater profit on patent ownership can be achieved:
Let ∆ t,A,B = t A,t − t B,t be the difference between country A and country B effective tax rates on IP revenues. The effective tax rate of a country y can be decomposed as t y,t = l y,t − r y,t , where l y,t is the level of corporate taxation in country y at t, and r y,t the tax rebate if there is a patent box in force in country y at t. Then, patent x will be transferred if
In the case of a transfer of ownership occurring between firms that are part of the same parent company, i = j. Under the assumption that the expected profit from patent protection do not vary with patent location, the buyer and seller, which are part of the same economic entity, have the same efficiency of patent portfolio management. Then,
From this, I derive hypotheses to be tested empirically.
Hypothesis 1. The number of international patent relocations:
(a) decreases in the corporate income tax rate l B , t and increases in the tax rebate r B , t of the destination country.
(b) increases in the corporate income tax rate l A , t and decreases in the tax rebate r A , t of the origin country.
Hypothesis 2. For an international transfer to be realized, the threshold in the differences of the effective tax rates:
(a) increases in the non-fiscal net cost of relocation C B,t − C A,t , which can be interpreted as the conditions imposed by the new tax regime.
(b) decreases in the expected patent revenue, generated by a greater patent quality or a better propensity to exploit patent ownership.
Similarly, the rational firm j will prefer to transfer patent x to country B rather than to any alternative destination B ′ if E(π x,j,B,t ) ≥ E(π x,j,B ′ ,t ). A patent will be transferred to B rather than
where
The threshold is increasing in the cost of location C B ′ of the alternative country, and vice versa for the chosen country B. The constraint is tightened by an increase of the corporate income tax rate in B and relaxed by a tax rebate in B. The opposite mechanisms apply for taxation variations in the alternative country B ′ .
Data

Patent data
The original sample contains all European patent granted between 1997 and 2015 and transferred by firms before their grant. The source of the data is the EPO PATSTAT Register -2016 Spring Edition.
I make use of the EPO Worldwide Legal Status Database -2016 Spring Edition, to identify granted patents applications that have been subject to a transfer of ownership. As highlighted in previous work (see for instance Ciaramella et al. (2016) ), all flows transfers of ownership may not be registered, however registers remain one of the best available sources of information. 213,569 patents have been registered as having changed ownership. This represents 23% of the total number of patents granted during the period, a share slightly above what is found in the U.S. for the most recent years in the study of Graham et al. (2015) . This difference might be explained by the institutional differences between Europe and the US, giving EU actors of the market higher incentives to register before grant due to higher transaction costs (Harhoff et al. (2009) ).
To identify 
Other data
Data on corporate income tax rates and patent box regimes was compiled using data extracted from the OECD, KPMG, Deloitte, PWC and Ernst&Young. Table 1 
Year: Year of introduction, CIT: Corporate Income Tax Rate, EFTR: Effective Tax Rate after the tax rebate. CIT includes surcharges, local income taxes and deductions, and other applicable income taxes. The Swiss patent box applies only in the canton of Nidwalden. Patent box regimes of Italy and the United Kingdom have been phased over respectively three and five years, with increasing deductions over the years following the introduction of the advantageous regime.
Patent boxes widely differ. Their most important feature is the tax rate they apply for income derived from Intellectual Property assets. In 2016, it ranges from 0 in Malta to 18.6% in Italy. To be put in perspective, the IP tax rate allowed by patent box regimes should be compared to the corporate income tax rate applied in the country. In patent box countries, it ranges from 12.5 to 35%. Patent boxes also vary in the conditions they impose on the tax payer to benefit from the tax relief. Only Portugal -and the withdrawn Irish patent box, explicitly excludes acquired IP assets from the scope of its patent box. The Spanish regime was also applying to self-develop IP only, but this criterion was relaxed in 2013. Belgium, the Netherlands and the United Kingdom regimes require further R&D development to be made by the tax payer, in order to benefit from the tax relief. Under the Luxembourgian patent box regime, IP acquired from directly related parties cannot benefit from the tax rebate.
Data on countries' macroeconomic characteristics was collected from the World Bank DataBank.
The index of patent protection was obtained from Park (2008) and is released every five years. I linearly extrapolated it to retrieve the missing values. I obtain country-pair variables in Mayer and
Zignago (2011) and Griffith et al. (2014) . Table 2 and 3 display summary statistics and the correlation coefficients. Corporate income tax rate of the destination country vary widely. It is comprised between 0% and 56.8%, with a mean of 24%. The tax rebate of the destination country is comprised between 0% and 36%, with a mean of 2.5%. The mean is pulled down due to the preponderance of the zeros in the data: excluding them, the average tax rebate provided by patent box regimes is of 18.3%. Luxembourg attract more than three time more patents than they lose. These three countries are known to practice attractive tax rates, and have -or have had, patent box regimes in force. Countries having implemented patent box regimes at early stages of the considered period -such as Belgium, the Netherlands or France, show positive balances, attracting in average more than two times more patent than they lose. Spain loses 2.5 more times patents that it attracts.
Descriptive statistics
Such heterogeneity in the volumes and indexes may indicate that several forces are at stake on the market for patents, and on firms' decision to relocate ownership. Countries attracting a high volume of patents and having a neutral index, such as Germany, are likely to be involved in real technology transfers transactions, where the transfer of patents is combined with a transfer of knowledge, and is likely to be followed with R&D efforts. Countries that gain much more patents than they lose but attract relatively little flows in terms of absolute volumes -such as Malta where patent revenues are totally exempt of taxation, might be chosen as a destination for fiscal motives. This would reflect agents' strategic behaviour to lower the tax burden they are facing, and has little to do with patent trade and knowledge transfer. Finally, European countries presenting a very positive balance while attracting high volumes of patents -such as Ireland, Luxembourg, and Belgium, are likely to be a destination of choice for patent transfers. They offer very attractive tax regimes through advantageous patent boxes, but also high skilled workforce, strategic geographical location and developed telecommunications. Firms might thus combine knowledge transfer to a qualified workforce with fiscal optimization. Such destinations appear to provide the perfect incentives for firms to combine both follow-on R&D, and fiscal optimization.
Econometric specification
The unit of observation is Y F,A,B,t , the number of patents transferred from firm F , originally located in country A and relocated in European country B during year t. compute the yearly pending patent portfolio, defined as the number of patent applications she owns that have not been granted yet, but will eventually be. For the years during which firm F has a non null pending patent portfolio, I include 0 observations flows for every country of potential relocation.
By doing so, I make the assumption that, for every year t during which firm F has a positive pending patents portfolio, it has the possibility to relocate its patents in each European country -either within or across the boundaries of its parent group.
In order to relate the observables with the model defined in Section 3 and to test the hypotheses 1 and 2, I define g the indicator function defined over five tuples {firm, initial location, potential destination, patent, year}, equal to 1 when constraints IC and IR are satisfied. Formally
Then, the number of patents transferred from firm F , originally located in country A and relocated in European country B during year t is given by
For patents having multiple owners, I slightly deviate from this representation, and ponder Y F,A,B,t accordingly. Let C o and C n be respectively the number of countries of initial ownership, and of new ownership, and C d and C a be respectively the number of countries that lost patent ownership, and that gain patent ownership. Then, in the setting of an international transfer with multiple ownership, transfer will be weighted by:
Patent Boxes and patent international relocation
I develop an empirical model to investigate the role of patent boxes in international relocations of patent applications to European countries. I estimate a count data model in the following form
where dummy variables to control for flows originating from U.S. and Japan. These control variables are included to ensure that the variation in the flows of patent relocation are not driven by an unoberved correlation between such macroecomic characteristics, and the level of taxation and patent relocation.
C A,B contains variables controlling for country-pair specificities. It includes a dummy variable for common official language, the measure of distance between the most populated cities of each country.
C A,B also contains a dummy variable to control for the existence of Controlled Foreign Company rules between a pair of countries. When CFC rules are binding, a company with home country A will still see its IP revenue taxed in A even if it has transferred its patents to a subsidiary located in B. CFC rules are designed to prevent firms locating income in lower tax countries in order to avoid higher taxation rates in their home country (see Griffith et al. (2014) for more details). ρ t is a full set of year dummies, included to capture common shocks over time. App F,t is the number of patents applied for during year t by firm F at the European Patent Office, representing the firm's patenting activity.
The dependant variable Y F,A,B,t contains a lot of zeros, and is highly over dispersed. Therefore, a negative binomial model is more appropriate than a Poisson model. This is confirmed by the computation of AIC and BIC criterion. Firms are not equally exposed to the opportunity to transfer patents. To account for this asymmetry, I include an exposure term, equal to the pending patent portfolio of firm F from country A during year t. This term represents the maximum number of eventually granted patent applications that firm could have transferred. To account for the fact that transfers originating from a firm might not be independent from each others, I cluster standard errors at the originating firm level. 5
Patent Box designs
I design a second model to investigate the effect of the features of patent boxes on the attractiveness of the patent box for patent relocation.
In this specification, I investigate three features of patent box regimes: the allowance for acquired IP, the requirement for further development from the tax payer, and the allowance for IP transferred intragroup. I focus on flows to countries having a patent box regime in force at date t. D Condition A,t is a dummy variable equal to one if the patent box features the specific condition. The associated coefficient captures the non-fiscal direct effects of the condition, for example the associated administrative burden. The interaction term (D Condition A,t x Tax A,t ) captures the additional effect of the condition on the patent box fiscal attractiveness. Table 4 displays the results of the first model outlined in Section 5. The objective is to assess the role of patent box regimes in firms' incentives to relocate patents. Columns (1) only contains the corporate income tax rate of the country of destination, as well as a dummy variable to take into account the presence of a patent box regime. The tax advantage provided by the patent box regime is included in Column (2), along with macroeconomic variables for the country of destination. It is removed in Column (6), in order to derive the global coefficient associated with patent box regimes. Fiscal and Macroeconomic variables of the origin country, as well as country-pair variables are incrementally added in Columns (3) and (4). The yearly number of patents applied for at EPO is added in Column (5). This measure of firm's patenting activity is used as a proxy for the firm's expected revenue from patent ownership specified in Section 3. Indeed, small entities such as start-ups are more likely to sell their patents (see Serrano (2010) ). Under this statement, greater patenting activity means a greater ability to efficiently exploit patent ownership, and thus, higher expected revenues. This measure is highly imperfect, as it does not consider patent characteristics. To account for this, I run a second set of regressions on the transfers of high quality patents only. Patent quality is proxied by the number of jurisdictions in which patent protection has been sought, i.e. by the family size (see Harhoff et al. (2003) ). High quality patents are defined as patents belonging to the top quartile in terms of family size. Results of the regressions considering only international transfers of high quality patents are reported in Columns (7) to (10).
Results
Patent Boxes and patent international relocation
The main variable of interest T axRebate, Destination captures the effect of tax reduction due to patent boxes on firms' decision to relocate patents. It has a positive effect on patent relocations in every specification, this effect being significant at the 0.1% level in almost every specification. It indicates that, all else equal in the model, countries offering a fiscal advantage for IP revenue significantly attract more patent relocation flows. The more tax reduction is allowed through a patent box regime implemented in a country, the more patents will be relocated to that country.
P atentBox, Destination captures the non fiscal effect of patent box regimes -when associated with T axRebate, Destination.
In opposition to what is found by Alstadsaeter et al. (2015) for patent applications, it does not have a significant effect at the 5% level on patent transfers, although it is also negative. This might reveal that the administrative burden, or the difference of treatment due to patent box regimes faced by firms is lower for patent relocation than for patent location. Binding CFC rules between country pairs, preventing firms for making fiscal optimization through assets relocation, is negatively associated with international patent relocation. This effect is significant at the 1% level.
The fiscal characteristics of the country of origin do not display significant coefficients. This finding indicates that firms do not significantly consider the fiscal characteristics of the country they are relocating their patents from. Altogether, the results show that the fiscal characteristics of the country of destination matter more than the fiscal characteristics of the country of origin in firms' decisions to relocate patents. It suggests that patents transfers are made with the objective to benefit from an advantageous tax policy, rather than with the objective to escape an unprofitable tax regime.
The level of firm's patenting activity is negatively associated with patent transfers, this effect being significant at the 0.1% level. Under the hypothesis that a bigger patent portfolio is associated with a more efficient use of the portfolio, this finding suggests that patents are transferred from entities with a lower ability to exploit efficiently patent ownership. Assuming that a more efficient management of patent portfolio generate higher patent revenues, the results show that patents are transferred from firms with lower expected revenues from patent ownership.
Columns (7) to (10) (5)).
Under the hypothesis that a bigger family size is associated with higher expected patent revenues, the results show that the incentives provided by patent boxes in firms' decisions to internationally relocate their patents are higher for patents with greater expected revenues.
I create a dummy variable, R&DHigh, Destination equal to 1 if the country of destination has a high level of R&D expenditure, defined as being above 2.5% of the GDP. 6 The objective is to test whether the effect of the tax advantage provided by patent box regimes is higher for R&D-intensive countries, i.e. whether firms are more sensible to tax incentives when they can more easily combine follow-on R&D efforts, and profit maximization. To make the link with the simple theoretical model presented in Section 3, higher R&D expenditures in the country of destination could be interpreted as a negative cost of owning a patent in the country. Table 5 reports the results of the new set of regressions, including R&DHigh, Destination and an interaction term between R&DHigh, Destination and T axRebate, Destination. Regressions in Columns (1) to (4) are run on the whole sample, whereas Columns (5) to (8) focus on high quality patents.
The coefficient associated with the tax rebate provided by patent box regimes is still significant in every specification at the 0.1% level, meaning that the higher is the tax advantage on IP revenues, the more patents are relocated to the country. Countries with a high share of R&D expenditure relative to their GDP significantly attract more patent relocations, this effect being significant at the 0.1% level in every specification. The third row shows the additional effect of the tax rebate when the patent box is implemented in a country with high R&D expenditures. The associated coefficient is positive and significant at the 0.1% level in every specification. It means that, all else equal in the model, the fiscal incentives for firms to relocate patents provided by patent box regimes are higher when the country has a high level of R&D activity.
Regressions on the sub-sample of high-quality patents present similar results, but of higher magnitude. It first means that, the higher the expected revenues of the patent, the more sensitive firms are to tax incentives on patent revenue. Second, it indicates that, the additional fiscal incentives provided by intensive R&D countries are higher for the relocation of high quality patents. Altogether, the results provide evidence that firms do consider several dimensions when deciding to relocate patents.
Although international patent relocation can be driven by fiscal optimisation motives, the fiscal incentives are stronger in countries with high levels of R&D expenditures. Indeed, such countries are likely to be a destination choice, as they allow firm to associate profit maximisation with follow-on R&D on profitable patents. This is all the more true for high quality patents. All else equal in the model, a firm response to a 1% higher tax rebate would be expected to be 2.25 times higher if the rebate occurred in an R&D intensive country.
Overall, the results partly confirm Hypothesis 1 and 2 derived in Section 3. The number of patent relocations increases in the tax rebate offered by the country of destination, and is sensitive to patents' expected revenue. However, the corporate income tax rate of the country of destination, and the fiscal characteristics of the country of origin do not display significant coefficients. Table 6 displays the results of the regressions on the second model defined in Section 5. The objective is to investigate the effects of the various designs of patent box regimes on firms incentives to relocate patents. Regressions in Columns (1) to (3) are run on the sub-sample of countries with a patent box regime in force, and investigate the possibility for patent box regimes to allow for acquired IP.
Patent Box designs
Regressions in Columns (4) to (6) are run on the sub-sample of countries with a patent box regime in force and allowing for acquired IP, and examine the development condition that can be imposed on a taxpayer to benefit from tax advantages on acquired IP. Regressions in Columns (7) to (9) are run on the sub-sample of countries with a patent box regime in force and allowing for acquired IP, and explore the possibility for patent box regimes to forbid IP acquired from a related company to benefit from a preferential tax regime.
The level of corporate income tax rate of the destination country has a negative and significant effect in every specification. It means that, among countries with a patent box regime in force, countries with a lower corporate income tax rate attract significantly more patent relocations. As in the previous sets of regressions, the coefficient associated with the fiscal variables of the origin country are not significant.
Patent box regimes can allow, or conversely forbid acquired IP to benefit from advantageous taxation rates. The coefficient associated with the tax rebate when the corresponding patent box regime does not allow for acquired IP is not significantly different from zero. On the opposite, the coefficient associated with the tax rebate of patent box regimes allowing for acquired IP is positive and significant at the 0.1% level in the three specifications. It means that, a higher tax rebate is associated with more patent relocations in countries allowing for acquired IP, whereas this is not the case for countries not allowing revenues from acquired patents to benefit from advantageous tax conditions.
Patent box regimes can impose on the taxpayer to perform further and substantial development of the acquired IP asset to benefit from the advantageous tax rebate. The coefficient associated with the tax reduction when the patent box does not impose a development condition is positive and significant at the 0.1% level in the three specifications. It becomes not significantly different from zero when the regime requires further development from the tax payer. These results indicate that higher tax rebates are not significantly associated with more incoming patent flows when the patent box designs impose the taxpayer to invest on R&D efforts. Although this finding should not be interpreted as causal in the absence of variation within countries, it suggests that regimes with a development condition might deter relocations only driven by fiscal optimisation motives.
Patent box regimes can also allow for acquired IP in general, but forbid IP acquired from related parties -such as parent companies, subsidiaries or sister companies, to benefit from an advantageous tax rebate. The coefficient associated with the tax rebate when the patent box design allow for related acquired IP is positive and significant at the 1% level in the three specifications. However, it becomes not significantly different from zero when the rebate cannot apply to IP acquired within the boundaries of the company group. Although no causality should be inferred, this result might indicate that an important share of the registered transfers of patent ownership are made between companies belonging to the same parent group. Such intra-group transfers can be tricky to identify in the data, as firms are likely to use shell companies in order to create confusion. The non significance of the coefficient associated with the tax rebate when intra-group transfers are not permitted to benefit from the tax allowance might be an indicator of the magnitude of the phenomenon.
Altogether, results from Table 6 confirm Hypothesis 2 derived in Section 3, and indicate that patent boxes with different designs provide different incentives on firms to relocate patents. In the absence of variation of the features of the patent box regime in a given country, the relationship between the design of the policy and the incoming patent flows cannot be interpreted in a causal way. However, the results suggest that policy makers could play on the designs of the patent box regimes to affect the incentives for firms to relocate patents, and to deter changes of ownership driven by fiscal optimization motives.
Robustness checks
Although they contain dummy variables for the US, Japan and the EPC membership, and year fixed effects, regressions displayed in Table 4 do not include country fixed effects. I create a new dependent variable, defined as log(1+Y F,A,B,t ), and run a new set of regressions, using OLS specification. Results are displayed in Table 7 . Regressions in Columns (1), (3) and (5) include origin and destination country fixed effects. Regressions in Columns (2), (4) and (6) contain country-pair fixed effects.
The coefficient associated with the tax rebate of the destination country is still positive and significant in almost every specification -although at a lower threshold than in the previous regressions.
The fiscal advantages of the origin country are still non-significantly correlated with firms' decisions to relocate patents. However, a notable difference from the results displayed in Table 4 is that the level of Corporate Income Tax rate of the origin country is now positively correlated with patent relocation, this effect being significant at the 5% level. However, it should be mentioned that, in the presence of heteroskedasticity, estimates from Table 7 are inconsistent (Silva and Tenreyro, 2006) .
Concerns could also arise from the fact that all transfers of patent ownership might not be registered, and that the sample is therefore incomplete. I define a new dependent variable, RoyaltyF lows, corresponding to the royalty and license fee flows between countries. 7 Although it also captures the flows of royalties linked with products with trademarks or copyrights that do not necessarily involve patents, this new dependent variable may also capture non-registered international transfers of patent ownership. Table 8 present the results of the new set of OLS regressions, performed at the country-pair level.
The coefficient associated with the tax rebate of the destination country is significant and positive. 8
Countries with a patent box regime in force significantly attract more incoming flows of royalties and licensing fees. The more important is the offered tax reduction, the greater are the incoming royalty flows. The corporate income tax rate of the destination country is negatively associated with royalty flows. As in the regressions of Table 4 , binding CFC rules are negatively correlated with royalty and license fee flows.
Intra vs Inter firm transfers
There is only one code for patent applications' changes of ownership in the EPO Worldwide Legal
Status Database. As a consequence, economic events of different nature are gathered under the same 7 Data is obtained from the World Bank. 8 It becomes non significantly different from zero when fixed effect for both the country of destination and origin are included.
appellation. When occurring between unrelated economic entities, transfers of patent legal ownership are likely to include a trade in technologies. However, registered changes of patent legal ownership also encompasses transfers between non-independent economic entities. These transfers are likely to represent economic events distinct from technology trade, and driven by different motives than knowledge transfer (see Ciaramella et al. (2016) for a more detailed discussion).
To deepen the analysis on patent box regimes and international relocations of patents, changes of ownership of different types should be isolated. I parse, standardize and disambiguate names of patents old and new owners. Then, I run the user-developed matchit Stata module (Raffo et al., 2015) . Based on the similarity score given by the algorithm, I sort each transfer in an "Intra-company" category when names are recognized as identical by the algorithm, and in a "Inter-companies" category otherwise.
Although it is certain that the "Intra-company" category is not misspecified, it is likely that patent transfers between related entities with non-similar names are included in the "Inter-company" group.
This misallocation might generate a bias in the coefficients when performing separate regressions on the two groups. To avoid this, I perform additional manual matching for each couple of the "Intercompany" category having exchanged more than three patents over the considered period. Patent relocation following the creation of a foreign subsidiary, the creation or the dissolution of a jointventure, and the acquisition of a firm or a business-unit are classified as "Intra-company". Table 9 presents the results of the regressions run on the sub-sample of relocations between couples having transferred more than three patents over the period. Therefore, their external validity is limited to couples registering transfers of patents quite frequently. Columns (1) and (4) display the results for both types of transfers. Columns (2) and (5) focus on patent relocations made between firms that are part of the same parent group. Columns (3) and (6) The coefficient associated with a higher tax rebate is of greater magnitude when considering couples interacting frequently than for the entire sample of transfers -see Table 5 . If a country with low R&D expenses were to increase its tax rebate by 1%, a firm's rate of intra-group transfers to that country would be expected to increase by 19%, all else equal in the model. Its rate of inter-companies transfers -that could be seen as "real patent sales", would be expected to increase by 18%, all else equal in the model. These results first show that countries offering fiscal advantages on revenues derived from IP ownership provide companies with incentives to relocate their patents within the boundaries of the group, and that these incentives are higher the greater is the tax reduction. This is significant at the 1% level. The similarity of the responses of intra and inter group transfers to an increase in the tax allowance reveals that the patent box regimes in non R&D-intensive countries are associated with as many patent relocations inside the boundaries of the company group, as locations of purchased patents. This result suggests that, although the fiscal optimisation of patent ownership can be made through intra-company relocation, it can also be one of the motives of patent relocation in the case of a real patent trade. Indeed, firms can easily combine the purchase of a patent with a strategic relocation in a country with an advantageous tax regime. This is all the more so true as transfers across firms are less regulated than transfers within firms. Binding CFC rules are negatively associated with intra-company relocations, but not with inter-firms transfers. This result is not surprising, as they do not apply for unrelated companies.
The results for intra and inter company transfers in R&D-intensive countries are different. A 1% increase in the tax allowance of a country with high R&D expenses would be expected to be followed by a 64% increase by a given company's internal relocations, all else equal in the model. This rate remains of 18% for inter-firms transfers. The results indicate that, all else equal in the model, firms are more sensitive to an increase of the tax rebate in R&D-intensive countries than in non-intensive countries when considering internal patent relocation. It shows that the fiscal incentives are stronger in high R&D countries, and thus suggests that firms combine follow-on innovation with fiscal optimisation in their decision to relocate patent ownership within the boundaries of the parent group. On the contrary, the non-significance of the coefficient of the interaction term for inter-firm transfers indicates that, in opposition to fiscal characteristics, R&D activities do not make a difference in firms' choices of location of purchased patents. This difference could be explained by different motives for patent relocation, but also by the fact that the legal constraints -such as the CFC rules or the development conditions, are more important on intra-company than on inter-companies transfers.
Identification issues
R&D expenditures of the destination country is used as an explanatory variable. Higher R&D expenditures may make countries more attractive for firms willing to relocate their patents. But R&D expenditures may also be higher thanks to the new investments generated by patent relocation. The reverse causality of the R&D expenditures of the destination country generates an endogeneity issue, likely to lead to inconsistent parameter estimates. In addition to back-end incentives, R&D effort might also be motivated by frond-end incentives -such as tax credits -that could also stimulate or deter flows of patent relocation. It is also possible that the level of R&D expenditures of a country, and its incoming and out-coming patent flows are jointly determined by unobservable characteristics.
For instance, the atmosphere in a country regarding the social standing of the position of researcher might affect both the level of R&D and the flows of patent relocation. To the best of my knowledge, the endogeneity issue of R&D expenditures has not been tacked in previous literature on patent box regimes.
I propose a control function approach. The instrument for R&D expenditures at year t is the share of governmental researchers per 1,000 people employed at year t. 9 I judge that the share of governmental researchers is a valid instrument for the level of R&D expenditures because there is no reason to think that it affects the flows of patent relocations between firms. Therefore, I think that the instrument is uncorrelated with the error term of the equation. One could argue that a change in the number of researchers of the private sector could affect the instrument, as well as firms' decisions to relocate patents. Such effect would challenge the validity of the instrument. However, the instrument is defined as the share of governmental researchers per 1,000 people employed -and not over 1,000 researchers employed. Thus, even in the presence of such an effect, it would be highly diluted. Moreover, in an open economy with a mobile labour force, the number of researchers of a given country is not fixed. Therefore, there is no reason to believe that the decisions of the private sector regarding their researchers would necessarily affect the instrument.
The instrument is highly correlated with level of R&D expenditures. The coefficient of correlation is of -0.49 for the destination countries, and -0.35 for origin countries, both of them being significantly different from zero at the 1% level. Table 10 presents the results of the second stage of the control function approach used to deal with the potential endogeneity of the R&D expenditures of the destination country. 10 11 By using a control function approach, I assume that the endogeneous variable has a linear reduced form, with an error term independent from the exogeneous terms of the first stage. I use a negative binomial regression in the second stage of the control function approach, thus assuming that it presents a negative binomial distribution with exponential mean. 12 Column (1) present the results of the regression run on the specification from equation (3), and Columns (2) to (4) the results of the regression run on the specification from equation (4).
The main variable of interest T axRebate, Destination of the first specification is still associated 9 Data is obtained from the OECD. 10 I run similar regressions to tackle the potential endogeneity of the R&D expenditures of the origin country, and of both countries. It appears that, unlike the R&D expenditures of the destination country, the R&D expenditures of the origin country are not endogeneous. Nevertheless, the results hold when considering only the endogeneity of the R&D expenditures of the destination country, or of both countries.
11 Results of the first stage are available upon request to the author. 12 I plan to re run the second stage using Poisson specification. It is more robust because neither the negative binomial, nor the Poisson assumptions are needed, and it is fully robust to any kind of over-dispersion.
with more numerous patent relocations when tackling the potential endogeneity of the R&D expenditures of the destination country, this effect being significant at the 0.1% level. Comparing with the results from Column (5) in Table 4 , the associated coefficient is of higher magnitude when I deal with the endogeneity issue. The level of R&D is positively and significantly associated with greater incoming patent flows. Comparing with Table 4 , the associated coefficient is of lower magnitude when controlling for the endogeneity of the variable. This difference suggests that, although countries with greater R&D expenses are more attractive for patent relocation, incoming patent flows might also increase R&D expenditures, and thus, indicating a reverse causality issue. The coefficient associated with the residuals of the first stage of the control function approach is significant at the 1% level, providing evidence for endogeneity.
The second set of regressions focuses on the design of patent box regimes. Results are similar are those presented in Table 6 . A greater tax rebate is associated with higher incoming patent flows in countries allowing for acquired patents, and allowing for intragroup transfers. As regard with the development condition, it has a mitigating effect on incoming patent flows when using the control function approach. The coefficient associated with the tax rebate is lower, and of lower significance when further development is imposed on the tax payer. The effect is null when the endogeneity of R&D is not considered.
Conclusion
This paper investigates the international strategic changes of patent ownership with regards to the fiscal characteristics of the involved countries, with a specific focus on patent box regimes. It also pays particular attention to how firms' incentives to relocate patent ownership vary with the heterogeneity of patent box designs. I discuss the potential endogeneity of R&D expenditures, and propose a novel instrument to tackle this identification issue.
I find that countries with a patent box regime in force significantly attract more patents, and that the volume of incoming patent flows is increasing in the offered tax rebate. The fiscal incentives provided by tax allowance are stronger when the patent box is in force in a country with a high R&D activity, suggesting that firms take several dimensions into account in their decisions to relocate patents. Fiscal variables of the origin country are not significantly associated with higher flows of relocated patents. It suggests that, when firms decide to internationally transfer their patents, they take advantage of an advantageous tax regime rather than they escape an unprofitable tax scheme.
I do not control for the reasons of implementation of the patent box regimes, and for unobserved chocks that could possibly affect some countries during some years of the period of observation.
Therefore, no direct causality should be inferred from the estimations. Nevertheless, the results show that firms respond to incentives provided by countries with patent box regimes, and that these responses are stronger the higher is the tax rebate, and the greater is the expected profit from patent revenue.
I also find that a higher tax rebate is significantly associated with greater incoming patent flows only in countries where the patent box regime does not impose conditions on the taxpayer to benefit from the tax rebate. Like relocations occurring between companies of the same parent group, international relocation following patent trade is sensitive to taxation. Although no causality should be inferred in the absence of variation in patent box designs within countries, the results indicate that policy makers could make use of the variability of the features of patent box regimes and play on the stringency of the rules governing patent transfers to deter those driven by fiscal optimization purposes.
The findings of this paper support the conclusions of the OECD/G20 Base Erosion and Profit Shifting project. Under their current designs, European patent box regimes that do not impose conditions on the taxpayer to benefit from a tax rebate on her acquired patents allow from a shifting of profit from where the value was created to another location. Such practices are in contradiction with the stated objective of patent box regimes. Patent boxes aim at stimulating R&D efforts by creating a favourable fiscal environment. However, in the absence of stricter regulation regarding acquired patents, firms can take advantage of the discretionary aspect of the patent location decision.
The concerns regarding the differentiation between the location of R&D efforts and the taxation location go beyond the issue of acquired patents. Indeed, under their current features, the majority of the patent boxes regimes allow for the taxpayer to perform R&D efforts abroad, and therefore to differentiate between R&D and taxation location also for non-acquired patents.
It has been revealed in December 2016 that Google has been able to avoid more than three billions euros of taxation on its revenues derived from its patent portfolio in 2015. This legal tax avoidance has been possible partially thanks to the "Dutch Sandwich/Double Irish" technique, that takes advantage of the heterogeneity of European regulations on taxation of profits derived from IP. This recent news provides additional evidence that the lack of coordination at the European level, along with very permissive conditions, can lead to substantial losses of revenues for governments. 
